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I. ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN REPLY TO 
IDHW'S BRIEF PURSUANT TO I.A.R. 35(c) 
While, of course, maintaining all arguments and authorities presented in her 
opening brief, AppellantlPlaintiff, Lynette Patterson ("Patterson") asserts the following 
additional positions in support of her appeal in this matter and in reply to the responsive 
brief filed by RespondentlDefendant, Idaho Department of Health & Welfare ("IDHW"). 
Of particular note, relative to her appellate positions regarding her claim under the Idaho 
Human Rights Act ("IHRA"), I.C. §67-5901, et seq., Patterson replies to IDHW's 
arguments by distinguishing the two, separate, anti-retaliation protections she enjoys 
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (generally "Title VII"), 42 U.S.c. §2000e-5, et 
seq. Under the protection afforded her by the participation clause, the objective 
reasonableness of Patterson's complaints of illegal conduct is not material. Under this 
analysis, the summary judgment entered on IHRA's claims should be set aside. 
Further, under the opposition clause, ample and genuine issues of material fact 
exist regarding the objective reasonableness of Patterson's complaints of illegal, 
workplace conduct, and the existence of these factual issues mandates a reversal of the 
summary judgment entered on Patterson's IHRA claim. On this last point, this reply 
brief also provides additional, significant authority which supports the proposition that 
Patterson's complaints about the workplace conduct being illegal were objectively 
reasonable. 
Finally with respect to her IHRA claim and though IDHW did not file a notice of 
cross-appeal on this point, IDHW asserts in its appellate brief that the District Court erred 
in finding that Patterson had been subjected to an adverse employment action. In this 
reply brief, Patterson will set forth the factual and legal bases that supported that ruling. 
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By laying out such bases, this Court will recognize that the District Court's ruling was 
appropriate, as genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude the entry of summary 
judgment on this point. 
Relative to her claim under the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act 
("IPPEA"), I.C. §6-21 01, et seq., Patterson herein provides additional authority and 
fleshes out further her argument that IDHW waived its affirmative defense of statute of 
limitations by failing to plead it. 
A. This Court Should Reverse the District Court's Dismissal of 
Patterson's IHRA Claim. 
As is well-settled, pursuant to O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 811, 810 P.2d 
1082, 1097 (1991), Idaho courts are to look to the growing body of federal case law in 
interpreting the parameters of the IHRA. In turn, most of the authority relied upon by 
Patterson in arguing her IHRA claim has been issued by federal courts. 
1. The dismissal of Patterson's IHRA claim was improper, as she can 
establish the prima facie case for Title VII retaliation under the 
participation clause. 
An employer is prohibited from retaliating against an employee for opposing an 
unlawful employment practice or making a charge in an employment discrimination 
investigation or proceeding. Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1558-59 (9th 
Cir.1994); Davenport v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Center of Community College 
District, 654 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1086-1087 (E.D.Cai. 2009). In the case sub judice, 
Patterson was participating in an employment discrimination investigation, when she 
voiced her complaints about the affair and preferential treatment to her employer's, a 
public agency's, human resources personnel and civil rights investigators. 
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The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or 
joint labor-management committee controlling 
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-
the-job training programs, to discriminate against any 
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate 
against any member thereof or applicant for membership, 
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). 
As the Ninth Circuit has held: 
An employer can violate the anti-retaliation provisions 
of Title VII in either of two ways: "(1) if the (adverse 
employment action] occurs because of the employee's 
opposition to conduct made an unlawful employment 
practice by the subchapter, or (2) if it is in retaliation 
for the employee's participation in the machinery set up 
by Title VII to enforce its provisions." Silver v. KCA, 
Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir.1978) (interpreting 42 
U.S.c. § 2000e-3(a) (§ 704(a))). "The considerations 
controlling the interpretation of the opposition clause are 
not entirely the same as those applying to the participation 
clause. The purpose of the latter is to protect the employee 
who utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his 
rights." Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 
695 (9th Cir.1978). The district court appears to have 
examined Hashimoto's retaliation claim under the 
opposition clause only. Under the participation clause, 
however, there can be little doubt that Hashimoto's visit 
with the EEO counselor constituted participation "in 
the machinery set up by Title VII." As such, it was 
protected activity. See, e.g., Eastland v. Tennessee Valley 
Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 627 (lIth Cir.1983) (contacting an 
EEO officer is protected activity); Gonzalez v. Bolger, 486 
F.Supp. 595, 601 (D.D.C.1980) ("Once plaintiff ... initiates 
pre-complaint contact with an EEO counselor ... he is 
participating in a Title VII proceeding." (citations 
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omitted)), afj'd, 656 F.2d 899 (D.C.Cir.1981). Thus, we 
conclude that the district court erred in determining that 
Hashimoto failed to establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation. 
Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (emphasis added); see also Whitley v. City of 
Portland, 654 F .Supp.2d 1194, 1213 (D.Or. 2009). In the case at bar, Patterson is 
protected by the participation clause within Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. 
When Patterson complained to IDHW's human resources professionals and civil 
rights investigators, Bethany Zimmerman, Monica Young, and Heidi Graham, she was 
participating in the "machinery set up by Title VII." IDHW is obviously, as a state 
agency, a governmental actor. IDHW's employees are clearly acting on behalf of the 
state government, when they act within the course and scope of their employments. 
When Patterson complained to IDHW personnel within its human resources department, 
she was complaining to persons who were, in part, some of the machinery set up by Title 
VII and to police workplaces under that statute. 
Patterson complained on numerous occasions to these state actors about the illicit, 
intra-office romantic affair that was occurring between her supervisor and a coworker; 
she also complained about the preferential treatment which was occurring in the 
workplace as a result of that affair. R, Vol. III, p. 596; R, Vol. IV, pp. 626-627. 
Plaintiff's own, credible affidavit testimony also sets forth the civil rights nature of her 
complaints regarding the affair and the preferential treatment as well as IDHW's own 
recognition that that Patterson was engaging in a civil rights/Title VII investigation. R, 
Vol. IV, pp. 777-778. As such, she is protected by the participation clause within Title 
VII's anti-retaliation provision. 
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When protected by the participation clause, a plaintiff-employee is not required to 
demonstrate that her complaints were either expressing actual violations of law or were 
objectively-reasonable, if not actual violations of law. Under the participation clause, 
even a visit with an EEO counselor, similar to IDHW's human resources/civil rights 
investigators (i.e. Zimmerman, Graham, and Young), constituted participation "in the 
machinery set up by Title VII." See, e.g., E.E. 0. C. v. California Psychiatric Transitions, 
Inc., 2010 WL 2754358, *5 (E.D.Cal. 2010) (citing Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 
680 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
The participation clause includes those whom the employer has reason to believe 
is assisting the employee in protected activity. Id. (citing Wilken v. Cascadia Behavioral 
Health Care, Inc., 2007 WL 2916482, *27 (D.Or. 2007)). IDHW, by employing 
Zimmerman, Graham, and Young in their positions, certainly had reason to believe that 
these individuals were assisting Patterson in protected activity (i.e. complaints of 
preferential treatment and pay as a result of an intra-office, romantic affair). 
Given the intentionally broad ambit of the participation clause, Patterson was 
certainly engaged in a protected activity, when she complained to IDHW personnel about 
the affair and its attendant preferential treatment. Once engaged in that protected 
activity, Patterson could not be retaliated against. It is of no import that paramour 
favoritism does not violate Title VII; that analysis is only necessary under the opposition 
clause of 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-3(a). By contrast, under the participation clause of that 
statute, the employee-plaintiff s accuracy in reporting workplace conduct as illegal, as 
well as her good faith and reasonable belief in that illegality, are immaterial to the-
analysis. Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F .3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997); Booker v. Brown & 
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Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F .2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Holway, 439 
F.Supp.2d 180,222 (D.D.C. 2006). In tum, whether paramour favoritism is illegal under 
Title VII and. whether an objectively-reasonable person would consider it such are of no 
concern in gauging this case under the participation clause. Id 
In the case sub judice, while the reasonableness of Patterson's beliefs about the 
illegality of the affair and its resultant preferential treatment are considerations for the 
discussion, infra, regarding the opposition clause, it is not germane in the present discuss 
of the participation clause. When Patterson complained about perceived illegal conduct 
to the human resources/civil rights investigators within her state agency, she 
automatically was protected by the participation clause. As such, she was engaged in a 
protected activity. 
Being engaged in a "protected activity" is the first element of the prima facie case 
for retaliation under Title VII. See, e.g., Surrell v. California Water Servo Co., 518 F.3d 
1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008); EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1013 (9th 
Cir. 1983). When an employee protests the actions of a supervisor as being violative of 
Title VII, such opposition is a protected activity for analysis of a retaliation claim under 
Title VII. See, e.g., E.E.o.c. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 
2009); Trent v. Valley Electric Ass'n, Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994). Even 
informal complaints constitute protected activity. Noga v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 583 
F.Supp.2d 1245, 1262 (D.Or. 2008) (citing Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer 
Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000); Knox v. City of Portland, 543 F.Supp.2d 
. 1238, 1248 (D.Or. 2008). Under these plaintiff-friendly standards, which encourage 
employees to come forward about workplace misbehavior rather than chilling such 
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efforts, Patterson has demonstrated that her complaints about the affair and preferential 
treatment are "protected activity." 
By being engaged in a protected activity under Title VII due .to her participation 
in the agency's investigations and discussing the affair and preferential treatment with 
Zimmerman, Graham, and Young, it was error for the District Court to grant summary 
judgment on Patterson's IHRA claim. Patterson's IHRA claim should be reinstated and 
remanded to the trial court. 
2. The dismissal of Patterson's IHRA claim was improper, as she can 
establish the prima Jacie case for Title VII retaliation under the 
opposition clause, as her complaints and beliefs were objectively 
reasonable. 
Throughout this litigation, much ink has been spilled relative to whether paramour 
favoritism is illegal under Title VII. Patterson recognizes that the clear weight of 
authority is that paramour favoritism is not illegal under Title VII. However, that is not 
the critical enquiry. If Patterson can demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that she 
held a good faith, reasonable belief that paramour favoritism could be illegal, then the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment on her IHRA claim must be reversed. 
In a Title VII-retaliation case, the complained-of conduct need not actually be 
illegal, but the employee must prove that a reasonable person might have believed that it 
was true. Osher v. Univ. of Maine System, 703 F.Supp.2d 51, 66 (D.Me. 2010) (citing 
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 262 (1st Cir. 1999)). Whether 
a plaintiffs belief was 'objectively reasonable,' and not merely subjective, is determined 
based on the facts and the record presented. Martin v. State University of New York, 704 
F.Supp.2d 202,228 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Thomas v. Westchester County Health Care 
Corp., 232 F.Supp.2d 273,279 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Objectiveness, as it is measured in this 
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context (i.e. Title VII-retaliation cases), must make due allowance for the limited 
knowledge possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of 
their claims. Mayo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994). This last point should 
resonate, as it recognizes the societal reality that most American employees are not 
familiar with the intricacies of Title VII law. 
The standard used is that of a "reasonable person," not a "reasonable lawyer" or a 
"reasonable paralegal." Patterson's knowledge of the substantive law relative to 
violations of Title VII is not dispositive of this aspect of the instant appeal. There is 
evidence in the record from which a jury could properly determine that Patterson's 
beliefs about illegal, workplace conduct were objectively reasonable. The most notable 
evidence comes from her own interactions with and directives from her former employer, 
IDHW. 
First, IDHW's own human resources/civil rights personnel and investigators (i.e. 
Young, Zimmerman, and Graham) specifically advised Patterson that they were looking 
into "Title VII" violations relative to the intra-office affair and potential, preferential 
treatment that were occurring and that Patterson could seek further redress, if she was 
dissatisfied with the outcomes of these investigations. R., Vol. IV, pp. 777-779. Under 
these facts and circumstances, most every reasonable employee, if her employer is a 
reliable one (as one hopes a state agency is), would believe that the paramour favoritism 
that was occurring was illegal. Patterson is no different than any other such employee. 
Herein is genuine evidence that Patterson's beliefs were objectively reasonable. 
Second, IDHW specifically trained Patterson, in personnel trainings and 
workshops, that paramour favoritism was illegal and created a hostile work environment. 
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R., Vol. IV, pp. 776-777 and 782-792. Again, if one's employer is a reliable one, it is 
reasonable for an employee to trust that the employment trainings being afforded her are 
accurate statements. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10-11. 
Most notably, IDHW's arguments that the foregoing facts should basically be 
disregarded seem to forget that Patterson, at the summary judgment stage of the 
proceedings, is entitled to have every reasonable inference drawn in her favor as the non-
moving party. This certainly is the situation, where IDHW argues that Patterson's own 
affidavit somehow shows she did not consider paramour favoritism to be illegal until a 
late date (i.e. after she engaged in the protected activity). Respondent Idaho Department 
of Health & Welfare's Response Brief at 18-19. 
This position is unfounded and ignores significant evidence in the record, 
including, not the least of which, specific paragraphs from that very affidavit. In the 
Affidavit of Lynette Patterson in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Order Granting Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's IHRA Claim (R., Vol. IV, p. 776 
through R., Vol. V, p. 801), Patterson clearly spells out, in ~~4,5,6, and 8, that she had 
valid reasons to believe that the intra-office affair and preferential treatment were illegal 
and creating a hostile work environment. These paragraphs also set forth that she held 
these beliefs in the December 2004 through August 2005 time frame, which would be the 
same period when she was engaging in the activities protected under Title VII. R., Vol. 
IV, pp. 777-779. In tum, Patterson's own affidavit is not fatal as IDHW characterizes, 
especially as Patterson is the one entitled to every reasonable inference from the 
evidence, including- the reasonable inferences to be drawn from IDHW's own-training 
materials on sexual harassment and hostile work environment. 
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Apparently recogmzmg that its own training manuals indicate that paramour 
favoritism may be illegal, IDHW argues that an employer's own training manuals cannot 
provide a plaintiff with a reasonable basis to believe that she is engaging in protected 
activity. In doing so, IDHW relies upon Sherk v. Adea Atlanta, L.L.c., 432 F.Supp.2d 
1358 (N.D. Ga. 2006). This case is distinguishable. 
In Sherk, the employer's ethics handbook simply adopted a more restrictive policy 
regarding paramour favoritism than governing law in the Eleventh Circuit provided. 
Sherk, 432 F.Supp.2d at 1372. In the case at bar, IDHW also adopted a more restrictive 
policy on paramour favoritism and romantic relationships in the workplace. R, Vol. III, 
pp. 558-561. However, and more importantly, IDHW went much farther than did the 
employer in Sherk. IDHW went well beyond simply adopting a restrictive policy on 
romantic relationships in the workplace. 
IDHW actually trained its employees, including Patterson, that, "A sexually 
hostile work environment can be created by. . .granting job favors to those who 
participate in consensual sexual activity." R., Vol. IV, pp. 776-777 and 783. IDHW 
should not be allowed to run from this fact. It trained Patterson to believe that the 
preferential treatment which Stiles and the SUR Unit were receiving, as a result of the 
Warren/Stiles affair and at the expense of Patterson and the Fraud Unit, could well be 
considered a "sexually hostile work environment." Frankly, there is probably no better 
evidence that a Title VII-retaliation plaintiff could proffer to show her objective 
reasonableness in believing that paramour favoritism was illegal. 
In a further, strained argument asserting that Patterson's beliefs were not 
objectively reasonable, IDHW contends that issues of reasonableness can be decided as a 
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matter of law. Respondent Idaho Department of Health & Welfare's Response Brief at 
15-18. While Plaintiff recognizes that such may rarely be the case, it certainly is not the 
-more common and generally-recognized rule of law in Idaho. See, e.g., Davis v. Parrish, 
131 Idaho 595, 597, 961 P.2d 1198, 1200 (1998); Thiel v. Stradley, 118 Idaho 86, 88, 794 
P.2d 1142, 1144 (1990); Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 122, 126, 
898 P.2d 53 (1995); Reynolds v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 362, 365, 
766 P.2d 1243, 1246 (1988). Moreover, in the face of above-noted evidence creating 
genuine issues of material fact relative to Patterson's objective reasonableness, this issue 
cannot be decided as a matter of law. 
IDHW cites Reece v. Pocatello/Chubbuck Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 1817787 (D.Idaho 
2010), for the proposition that reasonableness can be decided as a matter of law. Much 
like Sherk, the Reece case is materially and dispositively distinguishable from the case at 
bar. In Reece, no reasonable person could conclude that the plaintiff was engaged in 
protected activity under Title VII, because the plaintiffs/school teacher's complaints 
were about the sexual harassment of students, not coworkers. Reece, 2010 WL 1817787, 
*9. Title VII does not seek to regulate or manage teacher/student relationships, only 
employer/employee relationships. The very language of the statute itself only proscribes 
discrimination against an individual, " ... [W]ith respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. §2000-3(a) (emphasis added). 
Interestingly, Judge Winmill in Reece specifically relied upon the same instructional 
ruling from Mayo v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir. 1994) ("" ... [T]he Ninth Circuit 
held that the reasonableness of a plaintiffs belief that an unlawful employment practice 
occurred must be assessed according to an objective standard, 'one that makes due 
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allowance, moreover, for the limited knowledge possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs 
about the factual and legal bases of their claims."), upon which Patterson bases part of 
her own reasonableness argument, supra. 
IDHW also cites Moberly v. Midcontinent Communication, 2010 WL 1856454 
(D.S.D. 2010), for the proposition that a Title VII -retaliation plaintiff's reasonableness 
can be decided as a matter of law. Again, as with Shrek and Reece, IDHW's reliance on 
Moberly is misplaced. 
In Moberly, the court found that the plaintiffs beliefs were neither subjectively 
nor objectively reasonable. Moberly, 2010 WL 1856454, * 16. By contrast, in the case 
sub judice, the District Court has specifically found, "The Court fully credits 
[Patterson's] assertion throughout this litigation that she believed in good faith the 
conduct she opposed was unlawful." R., Vol. V, p. 840. That finding in itself makes 
Moberly materially inapposite to the case at bar. With the trial court already finding that 
her beliefs were subjectively reasonable and held in good faith, the objective 
reasonableness of Patterson's beliefs about improprieties in the workplace is that much 
more of a jury question. 
Patterson's reasonableness can only be decided as a matter of law, if no 
reasonable person could believe that the affair and preferential treatment were violations 
of Title VII. See, e.g., Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S., 268, 269-271, 121 
S.Ct. 1508, 1509-1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001). Given Patterson's discussions with 
IDHW's own human resources/civil rights personnel and investigators that Title VII 
violations were being investigated, IDHW's specific training of her that paramour 
favoritism could be illegal, and her complaint filed with the Idaho Human Rights 
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Commission that identified and alleged a hostile work environment (R., Vol. III, pp. 563-
565), reasonable people could properly conclude that Patterson's belief that paramour 
favoritism was illegal was held with objective reasonableness. 
3. If this Court reviews the District Court's finding that Patterson 
was subjected to an adverse employment action, it should not 
disturb that finding, as genuine issues of material fact preclude the 
entry of summary judgment on this point. 
In the trial court proceedings, IDHW moved for summary judgment on the second 
element of a retaliation claim (i.e. adverse employment action). That aspect of its 
summary judgment motion was denied. R., Vol. IV, p. 765. Without having filed any 
notice of cross-appeal, IDHW nonetheless challenges in this appeal that ruling from the 
District Court. While I.A.R. 35(b)(4) allows an appellee to raise additional issues on 
appeal, if an appellant's issues on appeal are insufficient, incomplete, or raise additional 
issues for review, nevertheless this Court should not even consider this argument. The 
denial of a summary judgment is not an appealable order. Aardeman v. us. Dairy 
Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 789,215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009); Hunter v. Dep't a/Carr., 
138 Idaho 44, 46, 57 P.3d 755, 757 (2002); Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. v. Cazier, 127 
Idaho 879, 884,908 P.2d 572, 577 (Ct.App. 1995); Ernst v. Hemenway and Moser Co., 
Inc., 126 Idaho 980, 895 P.2d 581 (Ct.App. 1995) (" ... [A]n order denying a motion for 
summary judgment is nonappealable per se and not reviewable."); Keeler v. Keeler, 124 
Idaho 407, 410, 860 P.2d 23, 26 (Ct.App. 1993). That is precisely what IDHW is 
appealing here - the denial of a portion of its summary judgment motion. 
However, should this Court substantively entertain IDHW's argument on this 
point in the face of clear precedent to the contrary, Patterson asserts the same arguments 
she raised in the trial court. These arguments resulted, of course, in a finding that 
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genuine issues of material fact existed which resulted in the denial of summary judgment 
on the "adverse employment action" element of the prima facie case for Title VII 
retaliation. R., Vol. JV, p. 765. Patterson thus incorporates by reference herein her 
arguments and authorities from the trial court on this point. See R., Vol. III, pp. 534-540 
(Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment), R., Vol. 
III, pp. 497-524 (Statement of Disputed Facts in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment), and R., Vol. III, p. 548 through Vol. IV, p. 729 (Affidavit of Jason 
R.N Monteleone in Opposition to Defendant's Motionfor Summary Judgment). 
In the trial court, Patterson clearly demonstrated that genuine issues of material 
fact exist relative to the issue of whether IDHW, her former employer, subjected her to 
any adverse employment actions. As such, the District Court's ruling on this point 
should not be disturbed. 
B. This Court Should Reverse the District Court's Dismissal of 
Patterson's IPPEA Claim. 
In her opening brief, Appellant previously outlined the factual issues that should 
have prevented the entry of summary judgment on her IPPEA claim and will not repeat 
them here. With the waiver portion of her argument, Patterson is primarily simply 
requesting this Court to apply the governing procedural rules, as they have been written. 
The law in Idaho is clear, and has even been most recently announced by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, that the failure to plead an affirmative defense required under 
I.R.C.P. 8(c) normally results in the waiver of that defense. Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 
187, 191, 191 P.3d 1107, 1101 (Ct.App. 2008) (citing Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 100, 
15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000), Garren v. Butigan, 95 Idaho 355, 357-359, 509 P.2d 340, 342-
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344 (1973), and Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 138,686 P.2d 79, 83 (Ct.App. 
1984 )). In facing the litany of Idaho cases that addresses the waiver of Rule 8( c) 
affirmative defenses for failure to plead, IDHW relies on Fuhriman v. State of Idaho, 
Dep't of Transp., 143 Idaho 800, 153 P .3d 480 (2007), a case that does not even involve 
an affirmative defense enumerated within I.R.C.P. 8(c). 
Fuhriman involved the statutory employer rule, under I.C. §72-223, an 
affirmative defense commonly-raised in hybrid tort actions in Idaho, where there is a 
workers' compensation claim and a related, third-party personal injury action. Fuhriman, 
143 Idaho at 803, 153 P.3d at 483. However, that rule of law is not one of the affirmative 
defenses referenced in I.R.C.P. 8(c). In tum, Fuhriman does not drill down to the core 
issue here. 
I.R.C.P. 8( c), in clear, mandatory terms, states, "In pleading to a preceding 
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... statute of limitations .... " I.R.C.P. 8(c) 
(emphasis added). Idaho's courts, unlike the federal courts, require a defending party to 
go even one step further and to specifically identify the precise statute that is providing 
the limitations defense. I.R.C.P. 9(h). Despite these procedural requirements in Idaho, it 
is uncontroverted that IDHW never affirmatively raised a limitations defense until the 
summary judgment proceedings. It never pled statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense in either its answer or its amended answer. Thus, under Idaho law, supra, it has 
waived that defense. 
During the trial court proceedings of the instant appeal, the District Court 
followed Fuhriman, though it recognized the statutory employer rule is not an 8(c) 
defense, because it found that Fuhriman relied on Bluestone v. Matthewson, 103 Idaho 
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453,649 P.2d 1209 (1982), which did involve an 8(c) defense, the statute of frauds. R., 
Vol. IV, p. 762. However, a full reading of Bluestone presents sound analysis supporting 
the proposition that IDHW waived its limitations defense. 
In Bluestone, the Idaho Supreme Court was reviewing a $390.00 dispute that had 
originated in the Magistrate Court of Nez Perce County. Bluestone, 103 Idaho at 453, 
649 P.2d at 1209. The affirmative defense at issue was the statute of frauds. Bluestone, 
103 Idaho at 454, 649 P.2d at 1210. Procedurally, the magistrate judge applied the 
statute of frauds defense, though it had not been pled, but the district judge found there 
had been a waiver of the statute of frauds defense. Id. In Idaho, appeals from Magistrate 
Court to District Court, in civil cases from a small claims department (e.g. $390.00) are 
conducted de novo. I.R.C.P. 83(b). In tum, the district judge in Bluestone was not 
obligated to follow the ruling that came out of the Magistrate Court. As the proceeding 
began anew at the district court level, and the statute of frauds had been raised (though 
not actually pled) at the magistrate court level, the parties were all fairly apprised at the 
practical inception of the litigation (i.e. the de novo review at the district court level). In 
tum, there was no substantial prejudice caused to any party in Bluestone by the failure to 
plead the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense, as the proceedings began anew at the 
district court level, but the statute of frauds defense had been considered at the magistrate 
court level. Here, such is not the case, as Patterson will suffer severe prejudice, if her 
IPPEA claim is dismissed with a limitations defense that was never pled by IDHW. 
Basically, the cases relied upon by IDHW that find no waiver of the affirmative 
defense are very procedurally distinct from the case at bar. Unlike those cases where the 
initial, formal position taken by the defending party in a litigation was its summary 
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judgment motion or otherwise occurred in situations where it was an appeal from a 
magistrate decision, the instant case had a much different, procedural history during its 
trial court proceedings. IDHW, unlike_ the parties tardily asserting the affirmative 
defenses in Fuhriman and Bluestone, answered the complaint, amended its answer once 
by stipulation, never moved to amend its answer further in over two years of litigation, 
yet still failed to properly plead statute of limitations, a defense which is specifically 
listed in I.R.C.P. 8(c) and also is subject to the particularity and specificity requirements 
ofI.R.C.P.9(h). 
Where, as here, a party has had multiple opportunities to plead the affirmative 
defense of statute of limitations, as procedurally required, that party must meet the 
pleading mandates of I.R.C.P. 8(c) and 9(h). Thus IDHW, by failing to raise its 
limitations defense until the summary judgment stage of this litigation, waived that 
defense. The trial court should therefore not have dismissed Patterson's IPPEA claim on 
this basis. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities, as well as those outlined in her 
opening brief, Patterson respectfully requests this Court to reverse the entries of summary 
judgment on both the IHRA and IPPEA claims and remand this case to the District Court 
for adjudication through trial by jury. 
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